Submitted by Reza Rafati on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 14:48
1.Hello
2.
3.I'm writing this to the world, so you'll know more about me..
4.
5.At first I want to give some points, so you'll be sure I'm the hacker:
6.
7.I hacked Comodo from InstantSSL.it, their CEO's e-mail address mfpenco@mfpenco.com
8.Their Comodo username/password was: user: gtadmin password: [trimmed]
9.Their DB name was: globaltrust and instantsslcms
10.
11.GlobalTrust.it had a dll called TrustDLL.dll for handling Comodo requests, they had resellers and their url was:
12.http://www.globaltrust.it/reseller_admin/
13.
14.Enough said, huh? Yes, enough said, someone who should know already knows...Am I right Mr. Abdulhayoglu?
15.
16.Anyway, at first I should mention we have no relation to Iranian Cyber Army, we don't change DNSes, we
17.
18.just hack and own.
19.
20.I see Comodo CEO and others wrote that it was a managed attack, it was a planned attack, a group of
21.
22.cyber criminals did it, etc. etc. etc.
23.
24.Let me explain:
25.
26.a) I'm not a group of hacker, I'm single hacker with experience of 1000 hackers, I'm single programmer with
27.
28.experience of 1000 programmers, I'm single planner/project manager with experience of 1000 project
29.
30.managers, so you are right, it's managed by a group of hackers, but it was only I with experience of 1000
31.
32.hackers.
33.
34.b) It was not really a managed hack. At first I decided to hack RSA algorithm, I did too much
35.
36.investigation on SSL protocol, tried to find an algorithm for factoring integer, analyzed existing algorithms, for now I was not
37.
38.able to do so, at least not yet, but I know it's not impossible and I'll prove it, anyway... I saw
39.
40.that there is easier ways of doing it, like hacking a CA. I was looking to hack some CAs like Thawthe,
41.
42.Verisign, Comodo, etc. I found some small vulnerabilities in their servers, but it wasn't enough to
43.
44.gain access to server and sign my CSRs. During my search about InstantSSL of Comodo which signs CSRs immediately I found
45.
46.InstantSSL.it which was doing it's job under control of Comodo.
47.
48.After a little try, I analyzed their web server and easily (easy for me, so hard for others) I got FULL access on the server, after a little investigation on their
49.
50.server, I found out that TrustDll.dll takes care of signing. It was coded in C# (ASP.NET).
51.
52.I decompiled the DLL and I found username/password of their GeoTrust and Comodo reseller account.
53.
54.GeoTrust reseller URL was not working, it was in ADTP.cs. Then I found out their Comodo account works
55.
56.and Comodo URL is active. I logged into Comodo account and I saw I have right of signing using APIs. I
57.
58.had no idea of APIs and how it works. I wrote a code for signing my CSRs using POST request to those
59.
60.APIs, I learned their APIs so FAST and their TrustDLL.DLL was too old and was not working properly, it doesn't send all needed parameters,
61.
62.it wasn't enough for signing a CSR. As I said, I rewrote the code for !AutoApplySSL and !PickUpSSL
63.APIs, first API returns OrderID of placed Order and second API returns entire signed
64.
65.certificate if you pass OrderID from previous call. I learned all these stuff, re-wrote the code and
66.
67.generated CSR for those sites all in about 10-15 minutes. I wasn't ready for these type of APIs, these
68.
69.type of CSR generation, API calling, etc. But I did it very very fast.
70.
71.Anyway, I know you are really shocked about my knowledge, my skill, my speed, my expertise and entire attack.
72.
73.That's OK, all of it was so easy for me, I did more important things I can't talk about, so if you have to
74.
75.worry, you can worry... I should mention my age is 21
76.
77.Let's back to reason of posting this message.
78.
79.I'm talking to the world, so listen carefully:
80.
81.When USA and Israel creates Stuxnet, nobody talks about it, nobody blamed, nothing happened at all,
82.
83.so when I sign certificates nothing should happen, I say that, when I sign certificates nothing should
84.
85.happen. It's a simple deal.
86.
87.I heard that some stupids tried to ask about it from Iran's ambassador in UN, really? How smartass you are?
88.Where were you when Stuxnet created by Israel and USA with millions of dollar budget, with access to SCADA systems and Nuclear softwares? Why no one asked a question from Israel and USA ambassador to UN?
89.So you can't ask about SSL situtation from my ambassador, I answer your question about situtation: "Ask about Stuxnet from USA and Israel", this is your answer, so don't waste my Iran's ambassador's worthy time.
90.
91.When USA and Isrel can read my emails in Yahoo, Hotmail, Skype, Gmail, etc. without any simple
92.
93.little problem, when they can spy using Echelon, I can do anything I can. It's a simple rule. You do,
94.
95.I do, that's all. You stop, I don't stop. It's a rule, rule #1 (My Rules as I rule to internet, you should know it
96.
97.already...)
98.
99.Rule#2: So why all the world worried, internet shocked and all writers write about it, but nobody
100.
101.writes about Stuxnet anymore? Nobody writes about HAARP, nobody writes about Echelon... So nobody
102.
103.should write about SSL certificates.
104.
105.Rule#3: Anyone inside Iran with problems, from fake green movement to all MKO members and two faced
106.
107.terrorists, should afraid of me personally. I won't let anyone inside Iran, harm people of Iran, harm
108.
109.my country's Nuclear Scientists, harm my Leader (which nobody can), harm my President, as I live, you
110.
111.won't be able to do so. as I live, you don't have privacy in internet, you don't have security in
112.
113.digital world, just wait and see...By the way, you already have seen it or you are blind, is there any larger target than a CA in internet?
114.
115.Rule#4: Comodo and other CAs in the world: Never think you are safe, never think you can rule the
116.
117.internet, ruling the world with a 256 digit number which nobody can find it's 2 prime factors (you think so), I'll show
118.
119.you how someone in my age can rule the digital world, how your assumptions are wrong, you already understood it, huh?
120.
121.Rule#5: To microsoft, mozilla and chrome who updated their softwares as soon as instructions came from
122.
123.CIA. You are my targets too. Why Stuxnet's Printer vulnerability patched after 2 years? Because it was
124.
125.needed in Stuxnet? So you'll learn sometimes you have to close your eyes on some stuff in internet,
126.
127.you'll learn... You'll understand... I'll bring equality in internet. My orders will equal to CIA orders,
128.
129.lol
130.
131.Rule#6: I'm a GHOST
132.
133.Rule#7: I'm unstoppable, so afraid if you should afraid, worry if you should worry.
134.
135.My message to people who have problem with Islamic Republic of Iran, SSL and RSA certificates are broken, I did it one time, make sure I'll do it again, but this time nobody will notice it.
136.I see some people suggests using VPNs, some people suggests TOR, some other suggests UltraSurf, etc. Are you sure you are safe using those? RSA 2048 was not able to resist in front of me, do you think UltraSurf can?
137.
138.If you was doing a dirty business in internet inside Iran, I suggest you to quit your job, listen to sound of most of people of Iran, otherwise you'll be in a big trouble, also you can leave digital world
139.and return to using abacus.
140.
141.A message in Persian: Janam Fadaye Rahbar
142.
143.
144.[UPDATE 1]: Also check this: http://pastebin.com/DBDqm6Km
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