The Story of Banking

The Story of Banking [p. 194-228]

constitution.org
[BOF:INCON 004] ---------------------------------------------------------------- Words appearing below in ALL CAPS appeared in italics in the original text. See the file IC-HELP.TXT for additional information and background. ---------------------------------------------------------------- I N V I S I B L E C O N T R A C T S George Mercier THE STORY OF BANKING [Pages 194-228] And that is the story of banking, in general; Profoundly juristic, and possessing little legal opposition [or shall I say, there is little juristic relief available anywhere for not recognizing and dealing with GOVERNMENT bank accounts precisely for what they really are]. So those bank accounts Mr. Condo entered into are very significant and very profound legal devices of CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE that attach King's Equity Jurisdiction, and not just for you and me, but also for small merchants not physically involved with Interstate Commerce. [269] [269]============================================================= In the Slip Opinion to UNITED STATES VS. PAUL CAMPO (2nd Circuit, Decided October 1, 1984, Docket #83-1370), a Manhattan Discotheque called "The Funhouse", which was not physically involved in Interstate Commerce (since when does walking into a business down the street in New York City mean crossing state lines?), became a business legally involved in Interstate Commerce by virtue of bank account contracts in effect with the King, and once the bank account relationship was established between the King and The Funhouse, as Mr. Campo's Commercial ALTER EGO, criminal liability for penal statues in Title 18, otherwise restricted to participants in Interstate Commerce, then attached, and the end result being that Mr. Campo was convicted of violating the HOBBS ACT (Title 18, Section 1951). =============================================================[269] While Mr. Condo ignored the wording on the bank account contract that specifically referred to the existence of other agreements he would be bound by, Mr. Condo went out and promptly did just the opposite of what his contracts called for: He started propagating factually defective and legally inaccurate tax advisory information (for which he charged a fee), and additionally, he went out and stood the King up by snickering at the prospect of providing any tax determination information whatsoever to the Secretary of the Treasury at all, claiming the protective penumbra of some rights found in a body of law not applicable to contemporary contracts. The LEIT MOTIF of the United States Constitution, and of its operating appendage, the Bill of Rights, and of the underlying Articles of Confederation (which are still in effect), and of other related organic documents, is the restrainment of Government from functioning as a Tortfeasor; and these documents were never, ever, designed or intended to negotiate terms of contracts. [270] [270]============================================================= "The Constitution has been remarkable for the felicity of its arrangement of different subjects, and the perspicuity and appropriateness of the language it uses [meaning the quality of clarity in meaning and understanding of ideas]." - DRED SCOTT VS. SANDFORD, 60 U.S. 393, at 439 (1856). Although that is true, nevertheless, Clauses governing Commercial contracts are excluded from its language, and hence, the Commercial Contract is excluded from the reach of its restraining Congressional mandates; with the result being that Commercial Contracts operate on their strata free from Constitutional supervision, and the Constitution cannot be used as a tool by either party to try and overrule, out maneuver, or otherwise weasel out of a Commercial Contract. =============================================================[270] We current Americans read the Constitution in the only way that we can: As Twentieth Century Americans up to our necks in juristic contracts. We look back to the history of that time of creation in 1787, and then forward slightly to the intervening period of application, but the ultimate question always recedes to the following: Just what do the words that our Fathers wrote in 1787 now mean in our time? [271] [271]============================================================= What is their applicability to the factual settings of today? "Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave its birth. This is particularly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.' The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophesy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be." - WEEMS VS. UNITED STATES, 217 U.S. 349, at 373 (1910). =============================================================[271] So what the words of our Fathers wrote in 1787, to restrain the Federal Government under a selected handful of Tort Law factual settings, remains as words down to the present time that apply to factual settings sounding in Tort. Additionally, there is a deeper correlative line to this question of vitiating excuse by ignorance. There are statutory laws, and there are judicial opinions, and they should be known. [272] [272]============================================================= "It is a familiar fact that in every English speaking community the body of law is divided into two portions: First, the so-called judgemade law, which is to be found in records and reports of the decisions and sayings of judicial officers; and second, the statute law, which consists of enactments by Parliaments, Congresses, or Legislatures, together with executive regulations and municipal ordinances adopted under powers lawfully delegated by legislative authority. According to the theory of English jurisprudence, the so-called judgemade law was not made by the judges at all, but existed, although not written, as the ancient and general custom of the English speaking people, and in the shape of ethical rules which they had tacitly recognized and adopted; but the authoritative evidence of such a custom was the decision of a court, and by the DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS, such a decision when once made became Conclusive Evidence -- conclusive within the territorial jurisdiction of the court until overruled by some higher tribunal -- conclusively establishing the existence of some rule which thereafter could not be changed except by legislative enactment. "This judgemade law has been called by its admirers the perfection of human reason; and theoretically there is no other good method equally efficacious of finding out what is the true rule of law applicable to any given state of things. It may be well to analyze the theory of judgemade law and to recall to mind the reason why it is theoretically superior to the work of the wisest legal philosopher, in order that we may realize more clearly why the theory is becoming less and less justified by the practical results." - Edwin Whitney in THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS, 3 Michigan Law Review 89, at 91 (1904). =============================================================[272] However, in this direction, there is a rather large body of law out there, in full force and effect in the practical setting, a body of law that has never been written down in any public place. This law carries the same and sometimes greater amount of operational weight as statutes themselves. [273] [273]============================================================= "Much of our law is not expressed in statutory form. Important parts of almost all subjects, and all, or nearly all, of the law on many subjects is expressed with binding authority only in the recorded decisions of the courts. When a case is presented to a court for a decision, prior decisions in cases involving more or less similar questions are precedents from which rules for the guidance of the court may possibly be derived. A rule thus repeatedly recognized through its frequent application by the courts becomes a principle of the common law. The greater the number, variety and importance of the transactions to which a principle applies, the more fundamental the principle. The decisions of the courts as a source of law are not confined to subjects on which no legislative provision exists. It is true that a statute may so minutely describe all the situations to which it applies that the courts have no other duty in connection with its application than to ascertain the facts of the case alleged to come under its provisions. The great bulk of our statutory law, however, is not of this character. Practically all statutes relating to substantive law contain one or more provisions sufficiently general to raise a doubt as to their proper application in some cases. Such a doubt can be resolved only by the decision of the courts." - REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT ORGANIZATION FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, at 66, dated February 23, 1923 in Washington, D.C. [American Law Institute Library, Philadelphia]. =============================================================[273] This corpus of law has its seminal point of origin in a multiplicity of different places, such as... 1. A phone call from Chief Justice Warren Burger ("I don't want this thing up here"); 2. The policy pronouncements that State and Federal Judges generate for themselves in the quiet conclave of their Judicial Conferences; 3. The quietly circulated judicial Memorandums from the Supreme Court and State Supreme Courts ("... things will be done this way on these types from now on") that circulate down to lower appellate forums and district trial courts; 4. The informal rap sessions and lectures sponsored for Federal Magistrates by the Aspen Institute at their Wye Plantation; 5. And on and on. [274] [274]============================================================= Just what factors do come into play to mold, influence, shape and direct the judgment exercised by a judge has been a subject of considerable thought by numerous authors. See a composite blend of numerous authors writing their views in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD [The Boston Book Company, Boston, Massachusetts (1917)], discussing such various topics as "Judicial Freedom in Decisions" [which is not permitted in France] and its Principles, necessity, method, and equity. Jerome Frank also once wrote a lengthy book entitled LAW AND THE MODERN MIND [Coward McCann, New York (1935)] explaining the many influences at work when Judges write an Opinion. Even hunches enter into judicial decisions -- see Joseph Hutcheson in THE JUDGMENT INTUITIVE: THE FUNCTION OF THE 'HUNCH' IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS, 14 Cornell Law Quarterly 274 (1929). =============================================================[274] So now that state of affairs, that confluence of non-legislative laws intellectually influencing the Judiciary, raises the inverse question of basic fairness of applying those largely unknown, highly detailed and quite intricate laws that are out there floating around, to people like Armen Condo who do not know any of them, and could not be expected to reasonably know of them since steps are taken to limit their exposure. [275] [275]============================================================= "The principles of the common law are developed by the slow process of judicial decision. The power that makes may modify and hence the common law has a flexibility which the statute law does not possess. A court may consider all facts of a case with a view to recognizing in any one or more of them a just cause for an exception to a previously recognized principle. Some uncertainty in the ramifications of the common law is therefore inevitable. It would exist although there was general agreement on clearly expressed fundamental principles, but the possible uncertainty is increased because unfortunately no such general agreement exists. It is not the duty of our courts to set forth the principles of the common law in an orderly manner, or even to express or explain them, except in connection with the application of one or more of them to the decision of a particular case. To obtain even an approximation to such an agreement on fundamental principles these would have to be set forth by public authority or by an agency commanding the respect and attention of the courts. There is no such agency, and this lack of general agreement on fundamental principles is the most important cause of uncertainty in the law." - REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT ORGANIZATION FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, at 68, dated February 23, 1923 in Washington, D.C. [American Law Institute Library, Philadelphia]. =============================================================[275] To the extent that Armen Condo is being held liable for terms of contracts he did not even bother to read, there can be no excuse by ignorance claimed. [276] [276]============================================================= People who sign contracts have a duty to read the content of the contract. For a legal commentary on this subject of Contract Law, see A DUTY TO READ -- A CHANGING CONCEPT, in 43 Fordham Law Review, at 341 (1974). =============================================================[276] To the extent that someone is held liable to the terms of laws deliberately hidden from his knowledge, ignorance is then excusable in this setting. So all factors considered, the bottom line on this ignorance line is this: People have to start taking some responsibility for their own affairs, and stop expressing somewhat passionate opinions that are in want of accuracy, and which expressions of discontent always try to shift responsibility for the act or non-act onto some other third party; in the case of Armen Condo, he came down on the King's Tax Collectors, the King's Attorneys, and the Federal Magistrate. The fact that Mr. Condo did not know of his contracts is an interesting question; a question I would very much like to come to grips with if I were a Magistrate. When a Person starts signing contracts, indifferent to the content and with an element of mild recklessness involved ("... it's just a checking account"), which contracts then refer to other binding contracts, and then a Defendant claims innocence through ignorance as an excuse to weasel out of his commitments, then there has to come a point in time when such a Person should pull his thumb out of his mouth and start to take some responsibility for the total content of the contracts he signs. When such claims of ignorance are interstitially placed in the defensive prosecution factual setting of someone who is totally and thoroughly convinced that they are absolutely correct (men like Armen Condo and Irwin Schiff), then there will come a point in time when mistakes have to be eaten, diapers have to drop, the reckless crudities of an earlier age are reversed, and the defective judgments exercised in a previous era (the decision to avoid learning the total content of one's contracts), collectively as a habit, are terminated, for good. The only thing that would irritate me as a Judge would be the continuing refusal of such people before my Bar to see their error, given an explanation of why they erred, with the refusal to see their error due to their own intellectual shell they live in, and their intellectual prejudice against the King. For example, in one such WILLFUL FAILURE TO FILE 7203 prosecution I examined in California, the Tax Protestor went through all the classic Constitutional Tax Protesting arguments in pre-Trial hearings. When the Federal Judge made the statement that: "... I think you are being used as a pawn by others to your own detriment." the Tax Protestor snickered back his resentment at the Star Chamber treatment he was being given. But if given a few moment's thought, such a statement by a Judge is quite significant: Because it means that the Judge has a considerable basis of factual knowledge on Tax Protestors, their arguments, the foolishness of their position in a Contract Law grievance, and the fact that the Tax Protestor is up against significant damages by likely protracted incarceration, and that the Judge might be sympathetic to repentance. In contrast, if a Judge ever blurted out those words to me as a Defendant, I would be on his case forever to find answers to the big question the Tax Protestor missed: Why, by whom, and how? And that difference in handling Judicial Rebuffment emulates the true seminal point of error that explains why Tax Protestors like Armen Condo mess up: They are not in a teachable state of mind, and they are their own worst enemy. If a Federal Judge told me that line in a prosecution I was going through, after having found out my error (that I was up to my neck in contracts with the King, and that my defiance was unethical and improvident), I would immediately capitulate, admit my error, sign it, file it, pay it, eat it: But the next time around, after having learned my error on that point, the IRS would have a different slice of meat to deal with. That model scenario of how I would have handled that 7203 Prosecution the Tax Protestor was going through (and whose appeal was properly denied and is now incarcerated) emulates a scenario I went through on a RIGHT TO TRAVEL Case I picked up. I once sent my Driver's License and "Cancellation Notice" back to the state department of motor vehicles, but the rescission was bureaucratically rebuffed with the explanation that no provision for the licensee's cancellation existed in state statutes; I knew the rebuffment had some merit to it, since those statutes formed the body of my contract where I initially applied for the Driver's License. I made several tactical mistakes back then; but I had made the fatal mistake of listening to Patriot Clowns who, while protesting State Highway Contracts, exaggerated the legal significance of the existence and non-existence of the written Driver's License document itself, telling me that the Driver's License was EVIDENCE OF CONSENT, and that the absence of which precludes the rightful assertion of a contract regulatory jurisdiction over motorists. [277] [277]============================================================= The Patriot community isn't the only place where clowns are to be found; some like to convey the image that their intellectual status carries weight, like Professor Raoul Berger of Harvard University, who wrote GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT [Harvard University Press, 1977]. He writes how the Supreme Court has departed from the Framer's original intentions of 1787 through the 14th Amendment, and he attacks the Supreme Court as being "... A grave threat to American Democracy" -- Not a surprising conclusionary Statement for an INTELLIGENTSIA clown to make, since his point of beginning was also defective: The United States was designed by our Fathers to be a Republic, not a Democracy, and the Supreme Court is not responsible for the enactment of those AFTER TEN Amendments which turned everything upside down [I will discuss later on that it was known, for example, before the Ratification of the 14th Amendment, that its impending enactment would very much create precisely these Federal-State power reversals that Raoul Berger incorrectly throws causality invectives at the Supreme Court institutionally, rather than at the 14th Amendment, which the Supreme Court was not responsible for ratification]. =============================================================[277] As I will explain later on, contracts never have had to be in writing to be judicially enforceable; the practice of stating the contract in writing is actually of recent historical development, since writing instruments and common literacy are quite relatively recent developments of technology. But after fielding numerous advisory opinions and getting a feel for the most likely statutes the Prince would later be throwing at me as I defied his Highway regulatory jurisdiction, I figured then that the best way to get the License cancelled was either by Declaratory Judgment, surrendering it to another state, or by getting it revoked by the state itself; By failure to pay a ticket fine. I knew that judges don't like people who drive on revoked Driver's Licenses (noticed that I said revoked, not suspended), but that alluring element of risk and naked defiance only enticed me all the more and so I decided to give it a whirl. I had done my homework: Several hundred motions and demands were on my computer, just waiting for a Case Number to throw at a judge and his Star Chamber Traffic Court. I picked up a speeding ticket and after questioning the Administrative Law Judge several times about the legal relationship in effect between the state and a person holding a revoked Driver's License, I was convinced that this was the way to go, after all, my legal mentors (Highway Contract Protestors) had counseled in this direction -- they insisted that where there was no Driver's License, there was no contract; and so I told the Administrative Law Judge that I would never surrender a dime to him. Hearing that defiant line from me in public, the judge revoked my license on the spot. I walked out of the Hearing Office, took the plates off my car and tossed them aside. Some months later, after leaving the office building where I had been at work for the day, I knew when getting into my car that the big scene was going to happen that night. I was on my way home from work that night when I was finally stopped and charged with several heinous misdemeanors [revoked license, failure to stop when ordered, and resisting arrest (which means demanding your rights), among others]. That Sheriff's Deputy did not have to stop and throw a prosecution at me, as other numerous police patrol cars had ignored my absence of license plates. [278] [278]============================================================= Considerably study has been given to the motivation, drive, and giblet cracking behavioral incentives that trigger some police to make an arrest and create damages, where other people simply turn around and walk away from it -- seeing no damages, they create none in response. See a research article by Goldstein entitled POLICE DISCRETION NOT TO INVOKE THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, 69 Yale Law Journal 543 (1960). =============================================================[278] I remember that I thought I was in some type of a LARGER THAN LIFE Hollywood movie production on that summer evening at the scene of the arrest. While filling out that NCIC Data Sheet of their's on me, the arresting officer asked me a very reasonable question: Gee, George, why were you driving on a revoked Driver's License? My response was to throw a few interesting Supreme Court quotations at him, whereupon he called for reinforcements and then turned me over to his commanding lieutenant; his lieutenant in turn then blew his top when I refused to consent to have them search the trunk of my car. [279] [279]============================================================= The police have a long history of getting huffy with folks. Back in the days of Colonial America, they were sometimes known as the INSPECTORATE, with Inspectors who secured compliance with the law by regulating a host of environmental and social situations and exchanges. For example, there were Inspectors of chimneys who claimed to have the right to enter into any house and determine whether or not a chimney was made of wood; there were Inspectors to check for the presence of pigs in the streets; and there were Inspectors to oversee the compliance of market commodities, weights, and measures with applicable standards. Among the general powers held by Inspectors were those to license, exact compliance, apprehend, enter private places without prior notice, and serve public notice. It was not uncommon to have several dozen such Inspectors in small communities, prowling around looking for something heinous to throw a prosecution at. Later on, these Inspectorial, Watch, and Constabulary functions were merged to form Police Departments in the 1800's. Over a period of time, municipal governments separated these functions, with the Watch and Constabulary functions becoming the task of police patrol; and the administrative Inspectorial functions being transferred to specialized departments or agencies of municipalities. For a detail study of the INSPECTORATE in Colonial America and of the origins of the first police departments in the United States, see S. Bacon's Ph.D. dissertation at Yale University, entitled THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MUNICIPAL POLICE: A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF FORMAL CONTROLS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1939). =============================================================[279] I was taken out of the patrol car, re-searched again, and then thrown back into the patrol car; but now the lieutenant changed his strategy in his attempt to get me to give my consent to let them search the trunk of my car, by pulling off a hybrid variant on the old MUTT AND JEFF police tactic. [280] [280]============================================================= What is called the MUTT AND JEFF technique by the Supreme Court is a criminal interrogation procedure commonly used whereby the police will present a pair of policemen -- both a friendly and an unfriendly type -- to interrogate the suspect. In my case, after the tough cookie lieutenant realized that his blowing his top was not going to trigger my consent, next they sent over a VERY NICE and smooth Sheriff's Deputy -- who just wanted to be so nice and friendly and passive about the whole thing, that he would keep that hot head lieutenant at bay and off my back if HE could just search my trunk. Well, they finally gave up and stopped asking for my consent altogether to search the trunk when I told Mr. Nice Guy that the consent they sought would not be forthcoming regardless of who they sent over to talk to me. So a MUTT AND JEFF tactic is where the police will present to someone two opposite and contrasting personality extremes, in order to trigger the desired admission/confession/consent, etc. In describing the MUTT AND JEFF tactic that the police love to use, in the application of its use during interrogations, the Supreme Court has said that: "... in this technique, two agents are employed. Mutt, the relentless investigator, who knows the subject is guilty and is not going to waste any time. He's sent a dozen men away for this crime and he's going to send the subject away for the full term. Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously a kindhearted man. He has a family himself. He has a brother who was involved in a little scrape like this. He disapproves of Mutt and his tactics and will arrange to get him off the case if the subject will cooperate. He can't hold Mutt off for very long. The subject would be wise to make a quick decision. The technique is applied by having both investigators present while Mutt acts out his role. Jeff may stand by quietly and demur at some of Mutt's tactics. When Jeff makes his plea for cooperation, Mutt is not present in the room." - MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436, at 452 (1965). =============================================================[280] But it did not work. The arrest operation had lasted across several hours; the Sheriff's Department had called out nine patrol cars and had detoured traffic around the arrest scene [they just love to put on a big production, after all, this highway is THEIR kingdom]. They probably resented the SUB SILENTIO Statement I was making by wearing very expensive business clothes and carrying a large amount of cash on me, while stingily refusing to spend so much as $18 to register my car. But I had a hunch that they resented most of all my cackles and giggling, which I had a difficult time restraining -- after all, this was a criminal arrest, this was heinous, I was supposed to "have done something wrong," I was supposed to have been feeling guilty, I was supposed to have earned a spanking. [281] [281]============================================================= Research on the decision making process by police to arrest or not arrest [or in my case, to intensify or not intensify the arrest scene] typically centers around the: "... social organization of arrest, especially how upon situational elements, such as the deference and social position of the suspect towards police, the preference of the complainant for arrest, and the social position of the suspect, affect the decision..." - Albert Reiss in CONSEQUENCE OF COMPLIANCE AND DETERRENCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF POLICE DISCRETION, 47 Law and Contemporary Problems 83, at 86 (Autumn, 1984). In the old days, the emphasis of the INSPECTORATE had always been preventative in nature, i.e., that of generating compliance with the Law. The known policy objectives back then were to protect the public from unscrupulous criminal adventurers, to develop public trust, and to facilitate the flow of Commercial activities. Unlike today, the INSPECTORATE'S job then was not that of filling jails (which were then few in number), but of preventing Tort violation by controlling and ordering relational standards among people. Initially, the power of police officers to arrest on their own authority was limited to matters committed in their presence and to the execution of Warrants to arrest. The reverse has gradually become to be the case nowadays. With the emergence and extension of the doctrine of arrest on PROBABLE CAUSE, the discretionary power of the police was expanded, and so as a result, the apprehension of criminals came to dominate the organizational police department mandate. With this objective in view, now the focus of police practice training shifted to conform to this exaggerated emphasis on arrest. Even today, little official attention is given to the following facts: 1. That the ordinary police officer on patrol infrequently makes an arrest in his daily duty [A RAND NEW YORK study reported an average arrest productivity of .22 Index crime arrests per man month for uniformed patrol, and .86 Index for detective's work. See P. Greenwood in AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPREHENSION ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, at 49 (Rand New York Institute, 1970)]; 2. Citizen reporting, and leads originating from Citizens reporting illicit behavior, accounts for the large majority of all arrests by patrol officers [A. Reiss in THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, at 84 et seq. (1971]. In short, the principle business of American policing is now the enforcement of Criminal Laws by detecting statutory infractions (of which few infractions actually require the factual presence of damages) and apprehending the offenders, who are then thrown at the criminal justice machinery for some indeterminate CRACKING. This contemporary Criminal Law now treats our Father's old values of peacekeeping and other order-maintenance functions as unimportant residual matters [a quiescent state of affairs a typical American police commander would probably snort at today as being patently unfeasible]. See generally, W. Spelman & D. Brown in CALLING THE POLICE: CITIZEN REPORTING OF SERIOUS CRIME (Police Executive Research Forum, 1981). =============================================================[281] I was in the patrol car facing West, so the large evening sun was setting over the roof of my car parked in front of us, and just like in some Hollywood CLICHE scenario, the Sheriff's Deputies had a small army of scavenger like silhouettes working my car over, taking whatever they could find in it, tossing it out on the road, and uttering salty frustrations at their legal disability to search my trunk without my consent. [282] [282]============================================================= Uttering salty frustrations is something that the police are very well acquainted with, as their progenitors in ancient Rome also got their cookies turned over by ventilating the unsavory expressions of the vilest slang then floating around Rome: "In the reign of Augustus, when Rome had a population of nearly a million, there was a police force of seven thousand men, with a commissioner, inspectors, captains, and lieutenants. Their twenty-one station houses were carefully distributed over the whole area of Rome. One of these old time stations was exhumed in 1868, and the remains of it show that the Roman police were well-housed and cared for. They had a fine building of marble and brick, with baths, a gymnasium, and a lounging-place for "reserves" who were not actually on patrol duty. "A peculiar interest attaches to this station house, because on its walls there still remain the jests and comments which the policemen scratched there when off duty. Many of the inscriptions seem very modern, for they are sometimes criticisms of those who were 'high up' -- sometimes even of the Emperor -- and they are often couched in slang, or in language that is viler still." - Richard Kemp in MUNSEY'S MAGAZINE, at page 441 ["The Evolution of the Police"] (July, 1910). =============================================================[282] After having decided that they were not going to find anything in the car to justify throwing another slice of LEX at me, they had one last item of business to attend to -- they wanted to make sure that I understood that this Government Highway was THEIR kingdom, and so they were determined to wipe that sneaky grin off my face. [283] [283]============================================================= This time, the Sheriff's bouncers were passively respectful of the Law, although they are not always so. The study of naked law breaking by the police is an art in itself; for an analysis of their sneaky circumvention of the EXCLUSIONARY RULE, see J. Skolnick in JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1960) and Stinchocombe in INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE DETERMINATION OF POLICE ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE, 69 American Justice Society 150 (1963). For their circumvention of suspect interrogation rules, see Reiss & Black in INTERROGATION AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, 347 Annals 47 (1967). For an examination of the illegal use of police force in general, see Reiss in POLICE BRUTALITY -- ANSWERS TO KEY QUESTIONS, 5 Transaction 2, at 10 to 19 (July/August, 1968). The general conclusion they reach collectively through their protracted intellectualizing is an obvious one: That the police are motivated in part by stimulation originating from the suspect, which stimulation can be either negative or positive in nature; and they are also motivated in part by the specificity and intensity of instructions to CRACK, by departmental management. =============================================================[283] So they decided to make their closing Statement for the evening by dragging me in front of a judge, and then throwing a Criminal Arraignment at me. At the Arraignment, I interrupted the Judge as he was reciting the charges to ask a very simple question: Is this a COURT OF RECORD? In response, the Judge threw an invective back at me that did not answer the question asked; rather his little deflectional snort was to state that he was just not a very good Judge to put such a question to. My response was to state that I was not a very good individual to throw a Prosecution at -- and with that, the Judge's face distorted into a dozen different directions; I had his giblets into a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 cracker for conducting an Arraignment without a transcript being made. The furious Judge now had an Adversary who apparently knew just enough to make him dangerous, so the Arraignment was moved into another room and started over again. I was up against some two years incarceration, but that really did not concern me. In the following weeks, after starting to hear some of my arguments in pre-Trial hearings, circumstances came to pass (after I was threatened with a 30-day commitment at the State Hospital for a Psychiatric Examination because I had continuously refused to hire a lawyer), [284] [284]============================================================= Criminal Magistrates want very much for you to have Counsel, as the mere lack of Counsel bars them incarcerating accused Persons. Frequently, I will refer to Magistrates ruling over chronologically compressed criminal ceremonies as STAR CHAMBERS; this characterization I merely borrowed from the Supreme Court, as they annulled a criminal conviction where Counsel was forced on an unwilling Defendant: "The Sixth Amendment, when naturally read, thus implies a right of self-representation. This reading is reinforced by the Amendment's roots in English legal history. "In the long history of British criminal jurisprudence, there was only one tribunal that ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal was the Star Chamber. That curious institution, which flourished in the late 16th and early 17th Centuries, was of mixed executive and judicial character, and characteristically departed from common law traditions. For these reasons, and because it specialized in trying "political" offenses, the Star Chamber has for centuries symbolized disregard for basic individual rights. The Star Chamber Court not merely allowed but required defendants to have counsel. The defendant's answer to an Indictment was not accepted unless it was signed by counsel. When counsel refused to sign the answer, for whatever reason, the defendant was considered to have confessed." - FARETTA VS. CALIFORNIA, 422 U.S. 806, at 821 (1975). Yet, there are writers that try and create the image that the King's STAR CHAMBER, along with its torture and dismemberment on political dissidents, really wasn't all that bad [see STAR CHAMBER MYTHOLOGY by Thomas Barnes in 5 American Journal of Legal History, at 1 (January, 1961)]; a stratagem of INTELLECTUAL CONTAINMENT by rewriting history that Gremlins are well acquainted with in other textual settings. =============================================================[284] where I was alone with the part-time state judge in his law office [I went to his law offices to serve him with an Emergency Appeal Notice, but the judge invited me into his own office for a chat, and so I had it out with the judge, right then and there]. I did not know it then, but the judge did not want the Emergency Appeal being heard before appellate judges. The meeting lasted for several hours, and the judge explained to me in a round about and vague way how I was wrong on the merits of the large volume of Tort Law arguments that I had thrown at him. He talked to me evasively about the duties of Citizenship (which is a Contract Law relationship), and how Licenses revoked by the state are in a special status where Contract Law still applies, although he did not specifically explain to me just why this is so; which means that I asked the Administrative Law Judge the wrong questions. [285] [285]============================================================= Asking the right question is a real art in itself, and very serious art at that: It is literally a matter of life and death, not just in this World, but even more so in the impending Third Estate as well. In 1949, the Supreme Court was asked a question: Did the refusal of the Trial Judge presiding over a murder conviction violate DUE PROCESS when the Judge relied on information at the Sentencing Hearing (after the Defendant was convicted by the Jury), whom the Defendant could neither confront nor cross-examine. The Supreme Court ruled that the 5th Amendment's DUE PROCESS CLAUSE applied to criminal prosecutions up until the time of conviction; therefore, sentence of death affirmed -- go get executed. [See WILLIAMS VS. NEW YORK, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (After a Jury convicts, the Judge is free to impose any Sentence within statutory guidelines, and the Judge is free to draw upon any information he feels like to make his decisions, such as previous convictions, etc.)]. For asking the wrong question, Williams got the electric chair. ... In 1976, the Supreme Court was asked the question whether the mandatory death sentence imposed by the North Carolina legislature violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, the answer came back: Yes, it did. For asking the right question, sentence of death reversed; no execution here. [See WOODSON VS. NORTH CAROLINA, 428 U.S. 280 (1978)]. =============================================================[285] When I probed deeper to extract detailed information as to whether it was the revoked nature of the old Driver's License that continued to attach a regulatory jurisdiction, he said loosely that my revoked License status was not relevant in holding me to those Motor Vehicle statutes, and that I could be held to those statutes even if I had never applied for a License. And so, even though I knew that he was withholding from me some Law that I wanted to know, I quickly reasoned that I was wrong not just for one reason, but for several substantive reasons, so I capitulated immediately, and the judge offered to give me a qualified dismissal, his head hanging down looking at the floor, probably finding his protracted conversation with some occasional sharp technical exchanges on the Law, particularly in the Counsel area, to have been simply incredible. And the prosecution so ended, quickly and unexpectedly. Suddenly, my RIGHT TO TRAVEL Case, that I thought I would be arguing on appeal, just fell apart and collapsed right in front of me; my Case that I had spent so long in preparation and in building up an air-tight defense line just vanished from underneath me; all of the incredible amount of time that I had spent researching and writing my large volume of justifying defense arguments, of digging out large volumes of Highway Cases from the 1800's, and all of my meticulous records preservation of an arrest scene factual setting where rights were demanded... all of that went out the window for a reason that I never originally contemplated, a reason that I never thought of, and a reason that I never even considered as probable as I was writing those copious Tort Law arguments: An invisible contract I had no knowledge of, that suddenly made an unexpected appearance. Yes, an unknown and invisible Highway Contract was actually in effect when I was driving around without a License in effect; a contract was in effect that my legal Patriot mentors had specifically and adamantly told me did not exist (since I was not using the Highways for a Commercial purpose and my Driver's License did not exist). But the Patriot advisors were point-blank wrong, and the contract did exist, as I will explain later; and the contract was invisible, and I have no recourse at all to my legal Protesting mentors who led me to the false conclusions that they did. And now I know, in a very real way, what a Witch or Bolshevik Gremlin will be feeling like at the Last Day before Father; having spent so much time and careful preparation in developing a line of defense to win a known impending Judgment, but it was all for naught as one tiny little invisible contract I had no knowledge of nullified my entire array of Tort Law arguments, up and down the line. I have some compassionate remorse for those poor Gremlins, as I know what they are going to be up against at the Last Day, and it isn't very pleasant. And just as I have no recourse to the Patriot clowns I listened to who exaggerated the legal significance of the Driver's License as being "the contract", so too will the world's Gremlins have absolutely no recourse to seek a redress from their mentor, Lucifer, who is now also leading them astray for the identical same reason: Important factual knowledge is being withheld from the Gremlins on the existence of an invisible Contract in effect with Father from the First Estate, which nullifies their Tort defense arguments and damages vitiation justifications. After I subtracted out my Tort Law related arguments that the invisible Highway use contract nullified, only a handful of procedural errors still remained (at that pre-Trial stage); I also had an interesting administrative estoppel, and also a strong automatic conviction reversal on the Counsel issue, but none of these were ON POINT to the RIGHT TO TRAVEL question itself that I had been juiced up to argue on Appeal. Unlike Tax Protestors, I have no interest in trying to argue Rights and numerous procedural deficiencies, while coming up to the appellate courts on the left side of the factual issue: Because the most important element of your defense is the factual setting, and that instant factual setting favored the Prince, as viewed from a judicial perspective: Multiple invisible contracts were in effect that I had no knowledge of. As I will explain later, when I used that Government Highway, I had accepted a special benefit that the New York Prince had conditionally offered to me -- offered with expectations of reciprocity being held by the benefit's donor, and so now an invisible contract was actually in effect. Unlike Tax Protestors, I am in a teachable state of mind, and so when a judge is trying to explain serious and fundamental error to me (as distinguished from mere philosophical disagreement with my defiance), I listen. There is wisdom in selective capitulation. For example, like being in a jail processing center and having 6 jail guards on you with choke holds to drag your fingerprints out of you through your blood, there are some circumstances where your failure to capitulate is to be discouraged. And that Tax Protestor from California I mentioned earlier, being up to his neck in contracts with the King, should have capitulated for his own good; his defense was lousy and his "Recessions" were never filed timely, and so he should have capitulated for that reason alone. Criminal prosecutions are adversary proceedings, and even if you are correct, your failure to explain why to the Court is necessarily fatal, when certain invisible juristic contracts the Judge has already taken IN CAMERA Judicial Notice of, are PRIMA FACIE Evidence of your taxation liability. Yet, there is a tremendous amount of value to be gained by being "Hardened" experientially, and our willingness to get our feet wet and be prosecuted even though we may be technically wrong for different reasons, will later prove to be to our advantage; as the Bolshevized threats of future Kings to pay or else be incarcerated, while shocking everyone else into submission, will fall on our deaf ears. For people like Armen Condo and Irwin Schiff, who have such strong political feelings against the King, this internal bias of their's is obscuring their own practical judgment. So correctly understood, addressing this Armen Condo/Irwin Schiff manifestation of sloughing off responsibility for their acts and relative state of factual knowledge onto third parties "... it's the King who's wrong, not me," more important than the problem of exercising judgment on a limited slice of the available facts, is the problem of they're not being in a teachable state of mind. When I sent Armen Condo that Letter, his reaction was to quickly toss it aside in the context of oral derogatory characterizations. Someone else found it and pulled out of it things Armen Condo saw, but never read. So the distinction between Armen Condo and the other fellow was that one was in a teachable state of mind, and Armen Condo wasn't. As a Judge, I could overlook ignorance when the now enlightened Defendants wants to remedy his prior misdeeds (negating the CORPUS DELICTI question of damages), but a non-teachable PERSON gets committed to a cage: His own worst enemy isn't the King, it's himself. [286] [286]============================================================= You and I, Mr. May, have an interest in being concerned about this since the sentencing of Irwin Schiff earlier this month in Hartford, Connecticut, to 3 years incarceration based on technical violations of his bank account contracts he adamantly refuses to get rid of, gives outsiders very strong impressions that this Movement is either illegal or unfeasible, and probably both. [In December of 1982, the IRS seized a large amount of money out of Irwin Schiff's bank accounts. Mr. Schiff then discussed his seizure and its secondary ramifications in a monthly publication he was editing at the time, called THE SCHIFF REPORT.] As for the public, the general attitude of outsiders is that if the kingpin of tax resistance research, Irwin Schiff himself, is unable to keep himself out of the King's Dungeon, then there just must not be too much substance to our philosophical position. It has always been difficult for folks on the outside to relate well to others who were being criminally prosecuted for political reasons. Last month, Irwin Schiff was being prosecuted under an infracted contract; Irwin Schiff had been selected for prosecution by reason of his high political profile. The significance of Mr. Schiff's taxation contract with the King that was presented to the Federal Judge wa